I want to know how the mind works.
To discover this, I combine philosophy with cognitive science.
To discover this, I combine philosophy with cognitive science.
The affective mind
What is an emotion? Why do headaches feel bad and orgasms good? In virtue of what do affective states motivate us? These are some of the questions that I tackle in my work. My ultimate goal is to get a complete picture of the affective mind.
Publications
1. L. Barlassina (forthcoming). Beyond good and bad: Reflexive imperativism, not evaluativism, explains valence, Thought.
2. L. Barlassina and M.K. Hayward (forthcoming). Loopy regulations. The motivational profile of affective phenomenology, Philosophical Topics
3. L. Barlassina (forthcoming). Valence: A reflection, Emotion Researcher
4. L. Barlassina and M.K. Hayward (2019). More of me! Less of me! Reflexive imperativism about affective phenomenal character, Mind, 128 (512): 1013-1044.
5. L. Barlassina and A. Newen (2014). The role of bodily perception in emotion: In defense of an impure somatic theory, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89 (3): 637-678.
In progress
6. L. Barlassina (in preparation). Valence wars: The imperative strikes back.
7. L. Barlassina (in preparation). Looking for troubles: Three stories of fear and pain.
Mindreading and mental simulation
Mindreading is the capacity to represent and reason about others' mental states. I maintain that mental simulation plays an important, but not exclusive, role in this capacity.
Publications
8. L. Barlassina and R. M. Gordon (2017). Folk psychology as mental simulation, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
9. L. Barlassina (2013). Simulation is not enough: A hybrid model of disgust attribution on the basis of visual stimuli, Philosophical Psychology, 26 (3): 401-419.
10. L. Barlassina (2011). After all, it's still replication: A reply to Jacob on simulation and mirror neurons, Res Cogitans, 8(1): 92-111.
In progress
11. K. Reuter, M. Messerli, and L. Barlassina (under review). It's a pleasure: An experimental investigation into the folk concept of happiness, (draft available upon request).
12. F. Antilici and L. Barlassina (in preparation). Knowledge-first psychology?
The Is-Ought interface
To make sense of the world, we make both normative judgments (e.g., judgments about what is right or wrong) and factual judgments (e.g., judgments about what caused what, or about what followed what). These judgments interact in some surprising ways. Studying these interactions helps us to unveil the cognitive mechanisms underlying them.
Publications
13. L. Barlassina and F. Del Prete (2015). The puzzle of the changing past, Analysis, 75 (1): 59-67.
14. K. Reuter, L. Kirfel, R. van Riel, and L. Barlassina (2014). The good, the bad, and the timely: How temporal order and moral judgment influence causal selection, Frontiers in Psychology, 5: 1-10.
15. T. Zalla, L. Barlassina, M. Buon, and M. Leboyer (2011). Moral judgment in adults with Autism Spectrum Disorders, Cognition, 121 (1): 115-126.
In progress
16. F. Del Prete, M. Kurthy, and L. Barlassina (under review). 'Must' implies 'can', (draft available upon request).