


PHI 202 Philosophy of Mind

Spring Semester 2016-17, University of Sheffield



Lecturer

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Lectures

Thursday 12-1, HRI LT3

Thursday 1-2, HRI LT3

Seminars (starting from week 3)

Thursday 4-5, JB-116

Thursday 5-6, JB-116

Office hours

Monday 3-4, Thursday 3-4, (or by appointment)

Philosophy Department, Room C09, 45 Victoria Street

Course Description

Right now, you are having a visual experience of this syllabus. Surprisingly enough, this simple fact is sufficient to generate a number of philosophical perplexities. To begin with, what is the nature of your visual experience? Without any doubt, your visual experience is somewhat related to what is going on in your brain. But what is the nature of this relationship? For example, is your visual experience *identical to* a state of your brain? Secondly, how can your visual experience be an experience *of* this syllabus? More in general, how can your mind represent the world to be a certain way? Finally, your visual experience has phenomenal character, that is, there is something it is like for you to have it, and this phenomenal character is different from what it is like for you to see a red tomato or to hear the sound of a trumpet. But how can your soggy, grey brain

can give rise to the phenomenal character of your experiences? More generally, what is the place of subjective experiences in an objective, physical world? These are among the fundamental problems in the philosophy of mind. In this course, we will discuss them and many other fascinating philosophical puzzles about the mind.

Intended Learning Outcomes

By the end of this course, you will have acquired:

- a solid knowledge of some of the fundamental problems of contemporary philosophy of mind
- a clear understanding of the main positions in the philosophy of mind and their development in the 20th century
- the ability to read and evaluate complex philosophical texts about the mind
- the ability to give clear and well-structured philosophical arguments about the mind, both in oral and written form
- the ability to relate problems in philosophy of mind with other philosophical and scientific problems

Schedule

The course is divided into 2 units. In the first (weeks 1-6), we will focus on the mind-body problem, that is, the problem of how mental phenomena are related to physical phenomena; in the second unit (weeks 7-10), we will consider how the mind can represent the world.

WEEK	LECTURES	SEMINARS
1	Intro + Dualism	*No seminar*
2	Behaviourism	*No seminar*
3	Identity theory	Dualism and behaviourism
4	Functionalism	Identity theory and functionalism
5	Consciousness I	<i>How to write a philosophy paper</i>
6	Consciousness II	Consciousness
7	The Language of Thought	The Language of Thought
8	Folk psychology	Folk psychology
9	Mental content	Mental content
10	Consciousness and content	Consciousness and content
11	Wrap up	*No seminar*

Readings

There will be two lectures each week. For each week, there will be one or more **core readings**. These core readings are compulsory: you are required to read them *before the lectures*. These core readings are also the readings that we will discuss in the *seminars*. All core readings will be available on the MOLE course website.

In addition to these core readings, I will also give you a list of **further readings**, which constitute a valuable starting point for essay writing. At the end of each week, I will also upload the **PowerPoint presentations** I used in class. Importantly, these presentations are not a substitute for either the readings or the lectures.

There is no **textbook** for this module. However, there are many excellent introductions to the philosophy of mind that you can usefully consult. For a first orientation to the field, you can browse through: I. Ravenscroft (2005) *Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner's Guide*, Oxford University Press; P. Mandik (2013) *This is Philosophy of Mind*, Wiley-Blackwell; and T. Crane (2015) *The Mechanical Mind*, Routledge. At a more advanced level, the best introduction to the philosophy of mind probably is: J. Kim (2010) *Philosophy of Mind*, Westview Press. G. Rey (1997) *Contemporary Philosophy of Mind*, Wiley, and F. Jackson and D. Braddon-Mitchell (1997) *Philosophy of Mind and Cognition*, Blackwell are good too. If you are looking for a **collection of classic papers**, I would suggest D. Chalmers (2002) *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings*, Oxford University Press, or W. Lycan and J. Prinz (2008) *Mind and Cognition: An Anthology*. However, exactly as in the case of textbooks, there are many others excellent anthologies. Finally, if you are looking for **encyclopedia** entries, the suggestion is always the same: forget about Wikipedia (it sucks), and consult the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (which is also online and free: <https://plato.stanford.edu/>).

Week 1, 9th Feb.: Intro + Cartesian Dualism

- Core readings:
 - Descartes, R. (1641). "Second Meditation" and "Sixth Meditation", in J. Cottingham (ed./trans.), *Meditations on First Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press.

- Further readings:
 - Bennett, J. (2010, ed.) "Correspondence between Descartes and Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia", http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/descartes1643_1.pdf
 - Foster, J. (1989) "A defense of dualism", in J. Smythies & J. Beloff (eds.), *The Case for Dualism*. University Press of Virginia.
 - Garber, D. (2000). "Understanding interaction: what Descartes should have told Elizabeth", in Id. *Descartes Embodied*, Cambridge University Press.

- Kim, J. (2005) “The rejection of immaterial minds: A causal argument”, in Id. *Physicalism, or Something Near Enough*, Princeton University Press.
- Kripke, S. (1980). “Lecture III”, in Id. *Naming and Necessity*. Wiley.
- Lowe, E. J. (2006). “Non-Cartesian substance dualism and the problem of mental causation”, *Erkenntnis*, 65(1): 5-23.
- Papineau, D. (2002). “The case for materialism”, in Id. *Thinking about Consciousness*, Oxford University Press.
- Wilson, M. (1978). *Descartes*. Routledge.

Week 2, 16th Feb.: Behaviourism

- Core readings:
 - Ryle, G. (1949). “Descartes’ myth”, in Id. *The Concept of Mind*. University of Chicago Press.
- Further readings:
 - Carnap, R. (1932/33) “Psychology in physical language”, *Erkenntnis*.
 - Chisholm, R. (1957). *Perceiving*. Cornell University Press.
 - Chomsky, N. (1959). “Review of *Verbal Behavior*”, *Language*, 35: 26–58.
 - Fodor, J. (1968). *Psychological Explanation*. Random House.
 - Dennett, D. (1978). “Why the law of effect will not go away”, in Id. *Brainstorms*, MIT Press.
 - Hempel, C. (1949). “The logical analysis of psychology”, in H. Feigl and W. Sellars (eds.), *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, Appleton-Century-Crofts.
 - Putnam, H. (1968). “Brains and behavior”, in R. Butler (ed.) *Analytical Philosophy*, Blackwell
 - Watson, J. (1913). “Psychology as a behaviorist views it”, *Psychological Review*, 20: 158–77.
 - Wittgenstein, L. (1953). *Philosophical Investigations*. Blackwell.

Week 3, 23rd Feb: The identity theory

- Core readings:
 - Smart, J.J.C. (1959). “Sensations and brain processes”, *The Philosophical Review*, 68(2): 141-156.
- Further readings:
 - Bechtel, W. and Mundale, J. (1999). “Multiple realizability revisited: Linking cognitive and neural states”, *Philosophy of Science*, 66: 175–207.
 - Davidson, D. (1970/1980). “Mental events”, in Id. *Essays on Actions and Events*. Oxford University Press.

- Feigl, H. (1958). “The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’”, in H. Feigl, M. Scriven, and G. Maxwell, G. (eds.). *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*.
- Fodor, J. (1974). “Special sciences: Or the disunity of science as a working hypothesis”, *Synthese*, 28: 97–115.
- Fodor, J. (1997). “Special sciences: Still autonomous after all these years”, *Philosophical Perspectives*, 11: 149–164
- Hill, C. (1991). *Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kim, J. (1992). “Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 52: 1–26.
- Kim, J. (2007). *Physicalism, or Something Near Enough*. Princeton University Press.
- Kripke, S. (1980). “Lecture III”, in Id. *Naming and Necessity*. Wiley.
- Lewis, D. (1966). “An argument for the identity theory”, *Journal of Philosophy*, 63: 17-25.
- Place, U.T. (1956). “Is consciousness a brain process?” *British Journal of Psychology*, 47: 44-50.
- Putnam, H. (1975). “The nature of mental states”, in Id. *Mind, Language and Reality*, Cambridge University Press.
- Shapiro, L. (2000). “Multiple realizations”, *Journal of Philosophy*, 97: 635–654.

Week 4, 2nd Mar.: Functionalism

- Core readings:
 - Putnam, H. (1975). “The nature of mental states”, in Id. *Mind, Language and Reality*, Cambridge University Press.
- Further readings:
 - Antony, L. and Levine, J. (1997). “Reduction with autonomy”, *Philosophical Perspectives*, 2: 83-105.
 - Armstrong, D. (1981). *The Nature of Mind*. University of Queensland Press.
 - Bennett, K. (2007). “Why the exclusion problem seems intractable, and how, just maybe, to tract it”, *Nous*, 37(3): 471-497.
 - Block, N. (1980). “Troubles with functionalism”, in Id. *Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 268–305.
 - Kim, J. (1998). *Mind in a Physical World*. Bradford.
 - Lewis, D. (1972). “Psychophysical and theoretical identifications”, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 50, pp. 249-258.
 - Loewer, B. (2007). “Mental causation, or something near enough”, in McLaughlin and Cohen (eds.) *Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind*. Blackwell.
 - Shoemaker, S. (1975). “Functionalism and qualia”, *Philosophical Studies*: 291-315.

Week 5, 9th Mar.: Consciousness I: The Knowledge Argument

- Core readings:
 - Jackson, F. (1982). “Epiphenomenal qualia”, *Philosophical Quarterly*, 32 (1982), pp. 127-136.
- Further readings:
 - Horgan, T. (1984). “Jackson on physical information and qualia”. *Philosophical Quarterly*, 34: 147-152.
 - Chalmers, D. (2005). “Phenomenal concepts and the knowledge argument,” in P. Ludlow et al. (eds.) *There is Something about Mary*. MIT Press,
 - Dennett, D. (2007), “What RoboMary knows,” in T. Alter and S. Walter (eds.). *Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge*. Oxford University Press.
 - Lewis, D. (1988). “What experience teaches”, *Proceedings of the Russellian Society*, 13: 29–57.
 - Loar, B. (1990/1997). “Phenomenal States” (Revised Version), in N. Block, O. Flanagan, G. Güzeldere (eds.), *The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates*, MIT Press.
 - Nida-Rümelin, M. (1997). “On belief about experiences: An epistemological distinction applied to the knowledge argument.” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 58(1):51-73.

Week 6, 16th Mar.: Consciousness II: Alternatives to physicalism

- Core readings:
 - Chalmers, D. (2003). “Consciousness and its place in nature”, in S. Stich and F. Warfield (eds.) *The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind*. Blackwell.
- Further readings:
 - Balog, K. (1999). “Conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem”, *Philosophical Review*, 108: 497–528.
 - Block, N., and Stalnaker, R. (1999). “Conceptual analysis, dualism and the explanatory gap’, *Philosophical Review*, 108(1): 1–46.
 - Chalmers, D. (1996), *The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory*. Oxford University Press.
 - Frankish, K. (2007). “The anti-zombie argument”, *Philosophical Quarterly*, 57: 650–666.
 - Goff, P. (2010). “Ghosts and sparse properties: Why physicalists have more to fear from ghosts than zombies’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 81: 119–37.
 - Hill, C. S. (1997). “Imaginability, conceivability, possibility and the mind-body problem’, *Philosophical Studies*, 87: 61–85.
 - Kirk, R. (1974). “Zombies v. Materialists”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 48 (Supplementary): 135–152

- Kirk, R. (2008). “The inconceivability of zombies”, *Philosophical Studies*, 139: 73–89.
- Levine, J. (1983). “Materialism and qualia: the explanatory gap”. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 64: 354–361.
- Nagel, T. (1974). “What is it like to be a bat?”, *Philosophical Review*, 83: 435–456.
- Nagel, T. (1979). “Panpsychism” In Id. *Mortal Questions*. Cambridge University Press.
- Papineau, D. (1998) “Mind the gap”, *Philosophical Perspectives*, 12: 373-388
- Yablo, S. (1993). “Is conceivability a guide to possibility?”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 53: 1–42.

Week 7, 23rd Mar: The Language of Thought

- Core readings:
 - Fodor, J. (1987). “The persistence of attitudes”, in Id. *Psychosemantics*. Harvard University Press.
- Further readings:
 - Blackburn, S. (1984). *Spreading the Word*, Oxford University Press.
 - Camp, E. (2007). “Thinking with maps” *Philosophical Perspectives* 21:1.
 - Carruthers, P. (1996). “Which language do we think with?” In Id. *Language, Thought, and Consciousness*. Cambridge University Press.
 - Churchland, P. S., and Sejnowski, T. J. (1989). “Neural representation and neural computation” in L. Nadel et al. (eds). *Neural Connections, Neural Computation*. MIT Press.
 - Dennett, D. (1978). “Cure for the common code?”, in Id. *Brainstorms*, MIT Press.
 - Fodor, J. (1975). *The Language of Thought*. Harvard University Press.
 - Fodor, J. (1987). “Why there still has to be a language of thought”, in Id. *Psychosemantics*, MIT Press.
 - Fodor, J. and Pylyshyn, Z. (1988). “Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis”, *Cognition*, 28: 3-71.
 - Laurence, S. and Margolis, E. (1997). “Regress arguments against the Language of Thought”, *Analysis*, Vol. 57, No. 1.
 - Rescorla, M. (2009). “Cognitive maps and the language of thought,” *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 60 (2): 377–407.
 - Rey, G. (1995). “A not ‘merely empirical’ argument for a language of thought,” in *Philosophical Perspectives* 9, pp. 201–222.
 - Schneider, S. (2011). *The Language of Thought: A New Philosophical Direction*. MIT Press.
 - Searle, J. (1980). “Minds, brains, and programs” *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* III, 3: 417–24.

- Smolensky, P. (1991). "Connectionism, constituency and the Language of Thought", In B. Loewer and G. Rey (eds.), *Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics*. Blackwell.

Week 8, 30th Mar: Folk psychology

- Core readings:
 - Churchland, P.M. (1981). "Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes", *Journal of Philosophy*, 78: 67-90.
- Further readings:
 - Dennett, D. (1987). "True believers: The intentional strategy and why it works," in Id. *The Intentional Stance*. MIT Press, 14–35.
 - Dennett, D. (1991). "Real patterns", *Journal of Philosophy*, 88: 27-51.
 - Goldman, A. (2006). *Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading*. Oxford University Press
 - Goldman, A. (2012). "Theory of Mind", in E. Margolis et al. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science*. Oxford University Press.
 - Gordon, R. (1986). "Folk psychology as simulation," *Mind and Language*, 1: 158–71.
 - Gopnik, A. and H. Wellman, 1994, "The Theory-Theory", in L. Hirschfield and S. Gelman (eds.), *Mapping the Mind: Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture*. Cambridge University Press, pp. 257–93.
 - Horgan, T. and Woodward, J. (1985). "Folk psychology is here to stay". *Philosophical Review*, 94: 197-225.
 - Jackson, F. and Pettit, P. (1990). "In defense of folk psychology". *Philosophical Studies*, 59(1):31-54.
 - Maibom, H., 2003. "The mindreader and the scientist," *Mind and Language*, 18: 296–315
 - Rudder Baker, L. (1988). "Cognitive suicide", In Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.), *Contents of Thought*. University of Arizona Press.
 - Sellars, W. (1956). "Empiricism and the philosophy of mind," in *Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science*, 1: 253–329.
 - Stich, S. (1981). "Dennett on intentional systems", *Philosophical Topics* 12(1):39-62.
 - Stich, S. (1983). *From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science*. MIT Press.
 - Stich, S. and Ravenscroft, I. (1992). "What is folk psychology?" *Cognition*, 50: 447–68.

EASTER VACATION [3 Weeks]

Week 9, 27th Apr: Mental content

- Core readings:
 - Putnam, H. (1973). "Meaning and reference". *Journal of Philosophy*, 70: 699-711.
 - Dretske, F. (1994). "If you can't make one, you don't know how it works", *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 19(1): 468-482.
- Further readings:
 - Boghossian, P. (1989). "Content and self-knowledge", *Philosophical Topics*, 17: 5-26.
 - Burge, T. (1979). "Individualism and the mental," in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy IV*: 73-121.
 - Davidson, D. (1987). "Knowing one's own mind", *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association*, 61: 441-458.
 - Davies, M. (1991). "Individualism and perceptual content", *Mind*, 100: 461-484.
 - Dretske, F. (1986). "Misrepresentation", In R. Bogdan (ed.), *Belief: Form, Content, and Function*. Oxford University Press.
 - Fodor, J. (1990). "A theory of content I", in Id. *A Theory of Content and Other Essays*. MIT Press.
 - Fodor, J. (1990). "A theory of content II", in Id. *A Theory of Content and Other Essays*. MIT Press.
 - Harman, G. (1987). "(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual role semantics". In E. LePore (ed.), *New Directions in Semantics*. Academic Press.
 - Millikan, R.G. (1984). *Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories*. MIT Press.
 - Neander, K. (1995). "Misrepresenting and malfunctioning", *Philosophical Studies* 79(2):109-41.
 - Papineau, D. (1998). "Teleosemantics and indeterminacy", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 76(1):1-14.
 - Stich, S. (1978). "Autonomous psychology and the belief/desire thesis", *The Monist*, 61: 573-591.

Week 10, 4th May: Consciousness and Content

- Core readings:
 - Tye, M. (2000). "Representationalism: The theory and its motivation", in Id. *Consciousness, Color, and Content*, MIT Press
 - Rosenthal, D. (2002). "Explaining consciousness", in D. Chalmers (ed.) *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings*. Oxford University Press.
- Further readings:
 - Block, N. (1990). "Inverted Earth", *Philosophical Perspectives*, 4, 53-79.

- Block, N. (1995a) “A confusion about a function of consciousness”, *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 18: 227–247.
- Block, N. (1995b). “Mental paint and mental latex”, *Philosophical Issues*, 7: 19-49.
- Block N. (2011). “The higher-order approach to consciousness is defunct”, *Analysis*, 71, 419–431
- Byrne, A. (1997). “Some like it HOT: Consciousness and higher-order thoughts”, *Philosophical Studies*, 86: 103–129.
- Carruthers, P. (2000). *Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dretske, F. (1993). “Conscious experience”, *Mind*, 102: 263–283.
- Dretske, F. (1995). *Naturalizing the Mind*. MIT Press.
- Goldman, A. (1993). “Consciousness, folk-psychology, and cognitive science”, *Consciousness and Cognition*, 2: 364–382.
- Goldman 2000. “Can science know when you are conscious?”, *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 7 (5): 3–22.
- Harman, G. (1990). “The intrinsic quality of experience”, *Philosophical Perspectives*, 4: 31-52.
- Kind, A. (2013). “The case against representationalism about moods”. In U. Kriegel (ed.) *Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind*. Routledge.
- Lycan, W. 1996. *Consciousness and Experience*. MIT Press.
- Mendelovici, A. (2013). “Intentionalism about moods”. *Thought*, 2(1):126-136.
- Neander, K., 1998. “The division of phenomenal labor: A problem for representational theories of consciousness”, in J. Tomberlin (ed.), *Language, Mind, and Ontology*. Blackwell.
- Rosenthal, D. (2005). *Consciousness and Mind*. Oxford University Press.
- Rosenthal, D. (2011). “Exaggerated reports: reply to Block”, *Analysis*, 71: 431–437
- Tye, M., 1995. *Ten Problems of Consciousness*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Tye, M. (1998). “Inverted Earth, Swampman, and representationism”, in J. Tomberlin (ed.), *Language, Mind, and Ontology*. Blackwell.
- Tye, M. (2003). “Blurry images, double vision, and other oddities: New problems for representationalism?”, in Smith and Jokic (eds.) *Consciousness*. Oxford University Press.

Week 11, 10th May: Wrap up (NO READINGS)

Seminar Readings

Seminar 1, 23rd Feb.: Dualism and behaviourism

- Descartes, R. (1641). “Second Meditation” and “Sixth Meditation”, in J. Cottingham (ed./trans.), *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press.
- Ryle, G. (1949). “Descartes’ myth”, in Id. *The Concept of Mind*, University of Chicago Press.

Seminar 2, 2nd Mar.: Identity theory and functionalism

- Smart, J.J.C. (1959). “Sensations and brain processes”, *The Philosophical Review*, 68(2): 141-156.
- Putnam, H. (1975). “The nature of mental states”, in Id. *Mind, Language and Reality*, Cambridge University Press.

Seminar 3, 9th Mar.: How to write a philosophy paper (NO READINGS)

Seminar 4, 16th Mar.: Consciousness

- Jackson, F. (1982). “Epiphenomenal qualia”, *Philosophical Quarterly*, 32 (1982), pp. 127-136.
- Chalmers, D. (2003). “Consciousness and its place in nature”, in S. Stich and F. Warfield (eds.) *The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind*. Blackwell.

Seminar 5, 23rd Mar.: The Language of Thought

- Fodor, J. (1987). “The persistence of attitudes”, in Id. *Psychosemantics*. Harvard University Press.

Seminar 6, 30th Mar.: Folk psychology

- Churchland, P.M. (1981). “Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes”, *Journal of Philosophy*, 78: 67-90.

Seminar 7, 27th Apr.: Mental content

- Putnam, H. (1973). “Meaning and reference”. *Journal of Philosophy*, 70: 699-711.
- Dretske, F. (1994). “If you can't make one, you don't know how it works”, *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 19(1): 468–482.

Seminar 8, 4th May: Consciousness and content

- Tye, M. (2000). “Representationalism: The theory and its motivation”, in Id. *Consciousness, Color, and Content*, MIT Press

- Rosenthal, D. (2002). “Explaining consciousness”, in D. Chalmers (ed.) *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings*. Oxford University Press.

Assessment

Assessment for this course will consist of two essays (25% each) and a final exam (50%). The exam’s questions will be pre-released.

The essays must be between 1500 and 2000 words each. The essay must be submitted electronically *and* in paper form. Electronic submission is done through MOLE. The paper copy has to be submitted by putting it in the Essay Deposit Box of the Department of Philosophy (45 Victoria Street). The deadline for the first essay is noon, Tuesday 14th March 2017. The deadline for the second essay is noon, Wednesday 17th May 2017. Late submissions will be penalized.

The final exam will last 2 hours and you will be required to write two essays.

Feedback

Feedback comes in many forms, for example: comments on a draft of a paper, answers to questions in lectures, discussions we have during seminars, and chats during office hours. In particular, during this module each student:

1. Will have the opportunity to discuss with me her/his plans for the essay and the exam (during office hours).
2. Will receive written feedback on her/his essay.
3. Will have the opportunity to discuss with me her/his essay feedback (during office hours).
4. Will have the opportunity to discuss with me her/his understanding of the material and her/his progress (during office hours).
5. Will have the opportunity to discuss with me her/his exam and exam grade. (by appointment)
6. We will also have a group draft-workshop during one of the seminars in which I will provide you with essay writing advice

It is your job to make the best use of these feedback opportunities.

Plagiarism

The following are serious academic offences and may result in serious penalties:

- (1) Plagiarism: the stealing of ideas or work of another person. It may take the form of cutting and pasting, taking or closely paraphrasing ideas and passages from books, articles, internet sites, etc. and submitting them for assessment without

appropriate acknowledgement. It may also take the form of buying or commissioning either the whole assignment or part of it.

- (2) Self-plagiarism: resubmitting previously submitted work (without proper acknowledgement). This may take the form of copying either the whole assignment or part of it.
- (3) Collusion: two or more people work together to produce a piece of work, all or part of which is then submitted by each of them as their own individual work. Collusion does not occur where students involved in group work are encouraged to work together to produce a single piece of work as part of the assessment process.